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Abstract 
Anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese in the first years of the 21
st
 century, not the 
first global surge in recent years, reached a high in 2008. One could ask how and why 
those sentiments developed when the Western states claimed to present no threat to China 
at the turn of the 21
st
 century. The subject of Chinese nationalism have aroused increasing 
academic interest, and many books and articles have been published, but Chinese anti-
Western nationalism in the first years of the new century has not yet become the object of 
adequate scholarly scrutiny. This article will trace the source of Chinese nationalism and 
examine the formation of such anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese people from 
2000 to 2010. 
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Izvleček 
Protizahodni občutki med Kitajci v prvem desetletju 21. stoletja, ki ne  predstavlja prvega 
globalnega vzpona v zadnjih letih, so dosegli vrh leta 2008. Lahko bi se vprašali, kako in 
zakaj so se tovrstni občutki razvili, ko zahodne države zatrjujejo, da ne predstavljajo 
nobene grožnje Kitajski na prelomu 21. stoletja. Tema kitajskega nacionalizma je vzbudila 
naraščajoče zanimanje med akademiki, številne knjige in članki so bili že objavljeni, 
vendar kitajski antizahodni nacionalizem na začetku 21. stoletja še vedno ni postal predmet 
ustrezne akademske raziskave. Pričujoči članek bo sledil izvoru kitajskega nacionalizma 
ter raziskoval formacijo tovrstnih antizahodnih občutkov med Kitajci od leta 2000 do 2010. 
Ključne besede: nacionalizem, anti-zahodni, Kitajska 
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1 Introduction  
The 2000s witness a surge of Chinese anti-West nationalism in the world. Many 
Chinese openly excoriated Western countries for considering China as competitor, 
constantly spying on China’s territories, promoting prejudice against the Chinese, 
demonizing China, attempting to destabilize China’s Olympic moment, promoting 
Tibetan independence, putting economic pressure on China, interfering with 
China’s internal affairs in the name of human rights, and others. Anti-Western 
sentiments among the Chinese in the 2000s, not the first global surge in recent 
years, reached a high in 2008. Ahead of the Beijing Olympics, constant Western 
attacks against Beijing on such issues as the Darfur conflict, global warming, 
protests in Tibet, and human rights abuses increasingly enraged many Chinese. 
Inside China, large-scale anti-French demonstrations were seen in more than 
twenty cities after the disruption of the Olympic torch relay in Paris and French 
President Sarkozy’s threat to shun the Olympic Games opening ceremony. Outside 
China, almost every pro-Tibetan protest was significantly overwhelmed by a 
greater pro-China protest all over the world. City streets and university campuses 
in many countries were filled with outraged Chinese demonstrators, waving red 
flags and chanting patriotic songs. One could ask how and why those sentiments 
develop when the Western states claim to present no threat to China at the turn of 
the 21
st
 century. The subject of Chinese nationalism have aroused increasing 
academic interest, and many books and articles have been published (Gries 2004; 
Guo 2004; Leibold 2007; Hughes 2006; Karl 2002; Wu 2007; Shen 2007; Wong 
1989; Laitinen 1990; Friedman 1992; and Unger 1996), but Chinese anti-Western 
nationalism in the 2000s has not yet become the object of adequate scholarly 
scrutiny. This article will trace the source of Chinese nationalism and examine the 
formation of such anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese people from 2000 
to 2010.  
 
2 The Rise of New Anti-Western Nationalism  
Anti-Western sentiment in China was growing in the 1990s and reached a high 
point in May 1999 when thousands of demonstrators went to the streets in main 
cities to protest against NATO air force that had alleged to wrongly bomb China’s 
embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia and took life three and wounded twenty Chinese.  
Demonstrators were in conflict with police at the American embassy in Beijing, 
destroying cars and windows. More than 170,000 people massed in front of the 
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U.S. consulate in Chengdu for several days following the bombing, and protesters 
set fire to the U.S. consul’s residence in that city. Police in Guangzhou in South 
China warned Western residents to stay indoors. The U.S. and British 
governments issued travel advisories for their citizens in China, urging them to 
remain in their hotels or homes. Protests in front of the U.S. and British embassies 
were the biggest anti-West demonstrations in China since the Cultural Revolution 
in the 1960s (Xu 2001, 151–62).  
A significant anti-Western backlash among the Chinese occurred in 2008 due 
to two major incidents. One is the alleged Western media bias, especially with 
regard to the March 2008 Tibet riots. The other is the 2008 demonstrations during 
the Olympic torch relay.
 
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the 
streets of many Chinese cities to denounce France and call for a boycott of French 
goods while hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese throughout the world were 
protesting against the Western media bias.  
The anti-Western sentiment increased in 2009 when a book, Unhappy China—
The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges, was published in March 2009 
(“Unhappy China” 2009). Written by Song Qiang and other four authors, Unhappy 
China, a collection of essays, argues that China has been too respectful to the 
Western world which is still hostile toward China. This book is a continuation to 
the popular anti-Western book, China Can Say No, written by the same author, 
Song Qiang, as well as three others and published in 1996 (“On Sino-U.S. 
Relationships” 2009). This new book encourages the Chinese government to 
become more aggressive rather than to be inactive in dealing with the West. This 
hot-selling book is stimulating debate among Chinese about nationalism and 
China’s position in the world. The authors contend that China needs to use its 
growing power and economic resources to set up its own position of dominance, 
claiming that the Chinese are most qualified to take the lead in the world in 
perspective of the human history, while the Westerners should be the second. 
After being released on March 13, this book became the bestseller on the list in 
China. The publisher claimed that it initially printed 270,000 copies, but 100,000 
copies were sold just in the month after its publication (Hille 2009).
 
 
Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s was different from that in the 
1990s. In the 1990s, anti-Western protests and complaints happened, by and large, 
mainly in mainland China. Most demonastors and protestors did not use internet 
widely as a means for communication. In comparison to anti-Western nationalism 
Guangqiu XU: Chinese Anti-Western Nationalism, 2000–2010  
 
112 
in China in the 1990s, Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s has two 
major characteristics. 
First, the overseas Chinese played a more important role than the Chinese in 
mainland China. Prior to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, the 
international leg of the Olympic torch relay was subject to extensive protests 
mainly due to China’s human rights record and Tibetan independence. Pro-Tibetan 
supporters aimed at the Olympic relay around the world. In London, for example, 
thirty-seven people were arrested when protestors clashed with police as the torch 
made its way through the city. In Paris, the relay was cut short and the torch was 
transported by bus after demonstrators interrupted the relay. Demonstrations also 
took place in Athens, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Canberra, Nagano, and 
Seoul between March and April 2008 (“Clashes Along Olympic” and “Olympic 
Torch” 2008).  
The Chinese were enraged. The Paris protest triggered special rage among the 
Chinese around the world when a Chinese female athlete in a wheelchair had to 
safeguard the flame from hecklers. Overseas Chinese lost no time in arranging 
“pro-China” counter-protests at the torch march. Protesters targeting the Olympics 
torch relay to oppose the Beijing government encountered counter-demonstrations 
by forceful and exciting Chinese living and studying overseas in defence of the 
Beijing Olympics. The Chinese were also protesting Western media coverage of 
the recent rioting in Tibet while protecting the Olympic torch relay from attackers. 
Counter-demonstrations against Tibetan separatism and Western media prejudice 
created headlines and editorials in major cities as the torch made its way 
throughout the world. Large-scale counter-protests of overseas Chinese and 
foreign-based Chinese nationals became the largest in the later parts of the relay. 
For the first time since 1989, overseas Chinese have become worldwide reports 
when they voiced disapproval in great numbers against the West and showed their 
support for the Chinese government (MacArtney 2008; Anast 2008; “Argentine 
Torch”; “Anti-China Protest”; “Bangkok Relay”; “Rival Demonstrators”; and 
“San Francisco”). 
Second, Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s is distinguished from 
that in the 1990s because the Internet played a more important part in inciting and 
expressing anti-Western sentiments. In the rise of new Chinese nationalism in the 
2000s, the Chinese used websites and online chat rooms to express their anti-
Western sentiments. Chinese anti-Western feelings on the Internet are more 
Asian and African Studies XVI, 2 (2012), pp. 109–134 
113 
pronounced than the broader feelings of the Chinese on the streets throughout the 
world (Ford 2008). In the 2000s, there has been an increase in chauvinistic, racist 
attacks in China’s online chat rooms presented in extreme language and aimed at 
the West. For example, when U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice was visiting 
Beijing in March 2005, many active Chinese participants in the online community 
of the Internet attacked her in China’s online chat rooms (Liu 2005). An anti-
French sentiment on Chinese web sites was rising in April 2008, including calls 
for economic embargo against all French manufactured products and goods 
immediately after President Nicolas Sarkozy openly claimed to boycott the 
Olympic Games (“Chinese Nationalism” 2008). 
Some Chinese also launch cyber warfares against the Western media websites 
whenever they think there is a bias against the Chinese. Though CNN, the cable 
news network, is available only in diplomatic compounds, high-end 
condominiums, and major five-star hotels in China, Chinese are still able to read 
reports from CNN as well as the BBC and to watch videos on YouTube. During 
the 2008 Tibet demonstrations, although the Chinese government restricted 
foreign media coverage about the disturbances, many Chinese were able to watch 
Western media reporting, soon becoming very angry. The Chinese web users, 
instead of turning to civil turbulence, backed the Chinese government and 
condemned Western news coverage of Tibet, calling it incorrect and biased with 
anti-China attitude. Following CNN’s allegedly biased reporting regarding the 
March 2008 unrest in Tibet, CNN became a particular target of anger. Its website 
was hacked and replaced with a page announcing that “Tibet was, is, and always 
will be a part of China.” CNN workers were forced to leave their Beijing 
headquarters during that time and retreated to a neighbouring hotel after they were 
flooded by irritated calls, as well as some intimidating violence (Magnier 2008).  
Some Chinese web users create websites to challenge Western media’s 
reporting of China. Rao Jin, a 23-year old student, created an anti-CNN.com 
website, portraying Western media reporting as white superiority (Deng 2009; 
Mostous 2008). Considering that Western media news stories include falsifications, 
this website claimed that it was participating in “a struggle of resistance against 
Western hegemonic discourse”. On the website, there is a slogan, “The World’s 
Leader of Liars”, and a photo that CNN ran on its website showing green security 
motor vehicle leaving behind an upturned car. On this photo, however, off to the 
right, the rock-throwing Tibetan protesters were cropped out. The website asks, 
“Your feeling about this manipulated photo?” The website also criticized several 
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other U.S., British, and German media for running shots of Nepalese police 
identified as Chinese battling rioters. The number of visitors to the anti-CNN.com 
website reached 100,000 only just one week after it was created on March 21 
(Kwok 2008).  
Chinese internet users, in China and overseas, claimed that some Western 
media sources had given dishonest reports about the Tibet riots in March 2008. 
They posted thousands of angry messages on websites and made strange crank 
calls to some Western media offices in Beijing. The Chinese internet users were 
more belligerent than those on the strees, as Tong Zeng, who facilitated the anti-
Japanese demonstrations in 2005, says that resentment about Tibet on the Internet 
was more articulated than wide-ranging emotion on the streets (Yardley, 2008). 
 
3 The Sources of Anti-Western Nationalism 
The new type of anti-Western nationalism mainly comes from four sources: 
Chinese government’s patriotism campaigns and anti-Western propaganda, the 
pride of Chinese people in their successful economic achievements, Western 
governments’ policies toward Beijing, and Western media’s bias against the 
Chinese. 
 
3.1 Official Propaganda Campaigns 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the Chinese government continues to preach 
patriotism––love of and loyalty to, or zealous support of, one’s country. The 
Chinese leadership exploits patriotism for several reasons. First, as the orthodox 
ideology has waned drastically, if not completely, in Chinese political life, and 
many Chinese have lost their confidence in Communism and Marxism, the 
leadership finds that it has little alternative but to cultivate national pride and 
patriotism to hold the country together during its rapid, turbulent transformation. 
Patriotism may be both a great driving force to encourage the Chinese people to 
revitalize the nation and a banner under which to unify different ethnic groups. 
Second, Beijing’s call for patriotism is designed to counteract regional 
decentralization, to divert attention from inequalities, such as the unequal 
distribution of wealth and the gap between the cities and countryside, to avoid 
civil unrest, and to shift public attention from domestic to international problems. 
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Before 2000, unfilled political slogans and boring teachings dominated 
traditional propaganda campaigns. Realizing that the traditional approach to 
propaganda has not attracted the public attention, particularly the youth, the 
Chinese leadership began to adopt new approaches to promote the patriotic 
education campaign (Wang 2008, 782–806). In October 2004, ten ministries of the 
central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as Ministry of 
Education and the Propaganda Department, jointly issued a statement, 
“Suggestions to Reinforce and Advance the Patriotic Education.” This official 
paper encourages government offices and education units to use a variety of 
educational methods, especially entertainment, as a means to promote patriotic 
education campaigns. They persuaded the Chinese to watch 100 chosen red films, 
read 100 chosen red books, and sing 100 chosen red songs, all of which focus on 
Chinese national humiliation in modern China. One of the 100 red books, titled 
Mo Wang Guo Chi (Never Forget State Humiliation), is on the list (Mo Wang 
Guochi 2002).  
The Chinese government also began to build many museums and public 
monuments to promote patriotic education. The central government established 
100 national-level demonstration bases for ideological reeducation while local 
governments began to found provincial-level and county-level patriotic education 
bases. Thus, several provinces spent more than 10 million Chinese Yuan yearly 
creating patriotic bases (“Zhongxunbu fuze” 2001). By 2006, five provinces or 
centrally administered municipalities—Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and 
Anhui—have established more than 400 provincial-level bases and nearly 2,000 
county-level patriotic education bases. More than 10,000 memory sites were 
created, and visiting these memory sites is becoming a normal part of all schools’ 
set of courses (Wang 2006). 
To urge more people to visit those patriotic education bases, the CCP Central 
Committee and the State Council started a red tourism campaign, a program to 
sponsor people to visit the former revolutionary bases and landmarks. In 2004, 
over 20 million tourists visited more than 150 major red tourism sites in thirteen 
provinces and municipalities (“China Boosts” 2005). The National Bureau of 
Tourism of China named 2005 “Year of Red Tourism” and published a list of 100 
red tourism points so as to promote a campaign of “Education with Tourism”. 
From 2004 to 2007, more than 400 million Chinese people participated in the red 
tourism program, visiting such popular destinations as Chairman Mao Zedong’s 
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birthplace in Hunan province and the CCP’s sacred place—Yanan in Shaanxi 
Province––the CCP’s revolutionary capital before 1949 (“‘Red Tourism’” 2007).  
The Chinese leaders also use national and traditional holidays to pursue a 
campaign of patriotic education, such as the New Year, Spring Festival, Women’s 
Day, Labour Day, Youth day, Children’s Day, the CCP’s Birthday, Army Day, 
and National Day. The patriotic subjects are especially emphasized during the 
holiday celebrations. Besides, the Chinese government annually organizes a series 
of activities to celebrate several important anniversaries of historical events. In 
2005, for example, the Beijing government initiated a grand campaign to 
memorialize the 60
th
 anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War all over China. 
The Chinese leaders understand that to incite patriotism without any opponents 
is impossible, and that Chinese nationalism would not be sustained without an 
obvious rival. Beijing concentrates on China’s humiliating past to stir up 
consciousness of suffering, underscoring the theme of disgrace on the Chinese 
brought by the West during the patriotic education campaigns. To heighten the 
traditional feeling of humiliation of a weak China, bullied by the West over the 
past 150 years, the Beijing government tries to convince the Chinese that China 
was a leading power in the world before 1839 and that the Chinese nation-state 
was declining and the Chinese were suffering significantly at the hands of Western 
powers from 1839 to 1949 because of Western powers’ invasion, bringing 
humiliation upon the Chinese. For instance, in his speech at the 2001 Conference 
celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the founding of the CCP, the CCP leader Jiang 
Zemin, glorifying the chief achievements of the CCP, claimed that the modern 
Chinese history has shown that, without the CCP, New China would not have been 
born, and that it is the CCP which brings to an end the humiliation on the Chinese 
and secures China’s national independence (“Jiang Zemin’s Speech” 2001). 
Humiliation education campaign is to keep the nationalistic enthusiasm going in 
order to mobilize domestic support for the CCP. 
The Beijing government also claims that today some Western powers that are 
hostile towards the Chinese are still posing a threat to China’s integrity and 
independence. On March 2, 2009, for example, the Information Office of the State 
Council of China published a white paper entitled “Tibet’s Democratic Reform in 
the Past Fifty Year”. The white paper asserts that “Western anti-China forces” in 
favour of the 14
th
 Dalai Lama are guilty of disregarding historical facts concerning 
Tibet, and that the so-called Tibet issue is absolutely not an ethnic, religious nor 
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human rights issue; more exactly, it is the Western anti-China forces’ endeavour to 
contain, split, and demonize China” (“Fifty Years” 2009). 
China’s media censorship itself is a factor in fostering anti-Western sentiment 
among the Chinese. Media in China always gives a one-sided view of the West. In 
international reporting, by means of choosy inclusion and exclusion, the press in 
China is very aggressive in promoting the anti-Western theme, which increases the 
suspicious of the Chinese towards the West. Stanley Rosen writes that the media 
censorship has helped cultivate “increasing suspicion and distrust” of the Western 
countries, the United Stated in particular, and justify the motivation for the Beijing 
government’s “self-serving” policy (Rosen 2003, 97–118).  
To build a politically, economically, and culturally unified China without 
Western influences which are regarded as threatening to the foundation of the 
Chinese government, Beijing promotes official propaganda on Chinese national 
humiliation and Western hostility toward China so as to urge the Chinese to wipe 
clean national humiliation and to increase Chinese’s suspicions of the West. Under 
such situation, an average Chinese believes that China, once the world’s greatest 
civilization, has fallen from grace and has suffered from poverty, Western 
domination, and numerous civil wars after the British defeated the Chinese during 
the Opium War of 1839–41.  
Beijing’s campaigns to incite profound sense of humiliation among the 
Chinese help foster anti-Western sentiments. In 2007, the Committee of 100, with 
assistance of Zogby International and Horizon Research Consultancy Group, 
published a report. According to the public opinion polls in this report, many 
Chinese still suspect the West’s motives towards China, resulting basically from 
historical experiences and specifically the century of humiliation. The polls report 
writes, “Nearly half of the Chinese feel that the U.S. is trying to prevent their 
country from becoming a great power.” (“Hope and Fear” 2007) After studying 
the emergence of new Chinese nationalism, Peter Gries concludes that anti-
Western sentiment, once created and encouraged by the Beijing government, has 
been taken up by the Chinese new youths, and the popular nationalism profoundly 
rooted in an account of past humiliations at the hands of the West will have an 
impact on the 21
st
 century China and the world (Gries 2004, 58).
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3.2 Chinese Pride 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, many people believe that the 21
st
 century belongs to 
China because China has an economic miracle in the world with an annual GDP 
rate of approximately 10% in the past three decades. The global financial crisis in 
the late 2000s, the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Depression of the 
1930s, resulted in the collapse of the large financial institutions, the failure of 
major businesses, and extensive declines in stock markets all over the world 
(“Three Top” 2009). 
In contrast to the West, China’s economy is making significan progress. By 
2010, China has surpassed Germany to become the largest exporter and second 
largest importer of goods in the world, and China’s GDP became the world’s 
second largest economy after the United States, exceeding Japan’s. Today, China 
produces more cars, builds more miles of high-speed railroad, has more cell phone 
users, and constructs more wind power than any other countries in the world. In 
addition, China is moving from export dependency to development of a domestic 
market so as to reduce China’s economic reliance heavily on Western market. 
Many Chinese believe that China could become the world's largest economy 
sometime as early as 2020. Economic success certainly resulted in rising of living 
standard. China’s economic miracle has enhanced Chinese people’s welfare. 
Chinese standard of living has increased drastically, expecially from 2000 to 2010. 
Wages in many cities and towns have been rapidly rising, and thousands of 
hundreds of peasants moving from countryside to urban areas yearly make more 
money than they did ten years ago (Ren 2012). 
More importantly, China’s economic wonder contributes to Chinese 
satisfaction and pride. China’s economic miracle encourages the Beijing 
government and Chinese scholars to make an effort to show the world, expecially 
many Asian and Africa countries, that China’s political and economic system 
would be another pattern, instead of Western model (Western democracy and 
market economy), to achieve economic expansion. Today, many Chinese have a 
righteous pride in China’s progress, ridiculing the decline of the West, especially 
its financial and economic crisis. Many Chinese believe that the West needs China 
nowadays, especially its financial resources to solve the Western financial crisis. 
According to Xu, many Chinese assume that they are reclaiming their rightful 
place as an international powerhouse in the world, a position they have lost 
decades before and they have been denied for many years (Xu 2001, 151–62). 
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Some Chinese also suggest that China need to redefine the rule of the games in its 
own terms, and that China should be an alternative to the meddling power of the 
West. As a result, the Chinese people are becoming more nationalist at home and 
more vocal abroad, especially in dealing with the West. The Chinese nationalism 
built on self-confidence demands a change of the current international order at the 
turn of the twentieth-first century.  
Economic nationalism is rising in the world, especially since the global 
financial crisis. China is developing large manufacturing industries and is the 
biggest exporter in the world, exporting an extensive range of commodities from 
clothing to electronics. In China, tens of millions of new job-seekers, including 
millions of peasants migrating from the country to cities, go into the market each 
year. Many Chinese think that, if the economy would not grow rapidly, the risk of 
social unrest would be huge, and that their country's survival would have to be 
based on an export-led and manufacturing-based economic strategy. Many 
Chinese hope to make money by exporting products to the world, developing 
overseas markets. The rise of China’s economy increased the trade deficit of the 
West. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with China climbed to $800 billion in 
2010. China is the largest creditor nation in the world
 
and owns approximately 
20.8% of all foreign-owned U.S. Treasury securities (Wong 2010; Shamim 2010). 
The huge trade deficits cause Western countries to put increasing pressure on 
Beijing to open China’s markets to Western goods and to stop governmental 
manipulation of its currency, since this makes China’s exports to the West cheaper 
and the Western exports more expensive. The Western countries strongly criticize 
that Chinese manufacturing firms compete unfairly at the cost of Westerners’ lost 
jobs due to the advantages of state support.  
To many Chinese, the Western countries are trying to impose their goods on 
China and threaten China’s new prosperity with harsh protectionism. The Chinese 
nationalism with the anti-Western sentiment is based on the Chinese frustration 
over China’s inability to overcome the economic barriers set up by the Western 
countries. They are equality determined to guard their own national interests. Anti-
Westernism is growing because of Western pressure on China’s economy. The 
anti-Western sentiment is an expression of new self-confidence and nationalism, 
which is commensurate with China’s growing economic power, in addition to its 
history, culture, and others. Dr. Robert Kuhn, an international investment banker 
and corporate strategist, is an adviser to the Beijing government for many years. 
Dr. Kuhn stated, “The pride of the Chinese people––pride in their country, 
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heritage, history; pride in their economic power, personal freedoms, and 
international importance. […] pride is the primary guiding principle that energizes 
a great deal of what is happening in China today” (Kuhn 2010). 
 
3.3 The Western Governments’ China Policies  
The Chinese masses’ anti-Western feelings resulted from policy disagreements 
between the Beijing government and the Western governments. At the beginning 
of the 21
st
 century, the West is still regarding China as a competitor instead of a 
partner and taking tough policies toward China on such issues as freedom of South 
China Sea, Tibet, China’s human rights, and others. The U.S. government’s 
approach to the U.S. spy-plane collision is an example. In April 2001, a U.S. EP-3 
surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 jet fighter. The Chinese plane split 
in half and crashed. The pilot parachuted out but was never seen again. The U.S. 
plane nearly crashed but was able to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island 
in Chinese territory. Chinese authorities took the crew of the U.S. spy plane into 
custody. At the beginning of this incident, Beijing took the assertive stance. It 
claimed that China’s sovereign airspace extends for 200 miles offshore and U.S. 
spy plane was in violation of its airspace, although most international agreements 
recognize only twelve miles. Tensions escalated, and each side blamed the other 
for the calamity. Beijing refused to release the crew until Washington issued a 
formal apology. The crew, however, was eventually released after American 
expressions of remorse over the loss of the pilot and aircraft (Kagan 2001).
1
 
While lodging a protest against Washington, Beijing presented its report to the 
Chinese. Thus, anti-U.S. nationalism was rising in China. Many Chinese did not 
regard this clash as an isolated incident––simple violation of Chinese sovereignty, 
but as the latest in a long series of Western aggressions against the Chinese since 
the Opium War of 1839–41. Chinese public anger over the spy-plane collision 
raged, but there were no fierce anti-U.S. demonstrations on the streets in the 
Chinese cities, unlike the incident in May 1999 when violent attacks against U.S. 
diplomatic facilities in China. This time Beijing did not condone any violence, 
censoring condemnations from discussions on the Internet and prevented the 
government-owned media from talking about this event. The Chinese were 
outraged, but their fury over this event faded eventually a year later when official 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of the politics of apology in this context, see Gries 2002, 173–8. 
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press reported the mourners at the fallen pilot’s funeral place in the city of 
Hangzhou (Pomfret 2001). 
China’s opposition to surveillance operations by an unarmed U.S. Navy 
surveillance vessel in waters off China is another case. In March 2009, an unarmed 
U.S. surveillance ship was hunting for Chinese submarines off China’s Hainan 
Island, the site of a major Chinese navy base. The U.S. ship was in international 
waters but in China’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. The ship 
was swarmed by Chinese vessels that tried to block it and destroy its sonar system. 
At one point a Chinese ship approached within eight meters of the American spy 
ship and littered wreckage in its path so as to damage American ship’s equipments. 
The U.S. Navy ship took action by turning its fire hoses on one of the Chinese 
ships. The incident was the most vulnerable military confrontation between China 
and the United States since the spy plane incident in 2001. It occurred just after 
both countries announced that they were considering a naval pact to avoid 
accidental confrontations at sea. Washington urged Beijing to observe 
international maritime rules while Beijing claimed that the United States had 
violated both the international and Chinese laws (“US Says China Harassed Naval 
Ship” 2009). 
The March 8
th
 confrontation reconfirms many Chinese’s notion of foreign 
states bent on encroaching upon China. Many Chinese believe that it is a 
deliberate and provocative act, and that no people would be contented to see 
foreigners arrogantly carrying out spy actions directly in front of their country. 
Some Chinese claim that the U.S. government understood quite well that this 
would irritate China, but it just only did not mind. Wang Xiaodong, a nationalist 
scholar who contributed several chapters to the anti-Western book, Unhappy 
China, states that “If Obama wants to talk about world peace, not sending troops 
abroad, and so on, then what is the U.S. Navy doing in the South China Sea?” 
(Ramzy 2009) 
Western governments’ criticism on Beijing’s Tibet policy causes much 
antagonism among the Chinese. The Western governments have long been a critic 
of China’s Tibet policy and in favour of Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader. In 
October 2007, President Bush and the leaders of U.S. Congress bestowed the 
Congressional Gold Medal, the nation’s highest civilian honour, upon the Dalai 
Lama, calling the exiled Tibetan religious leader a “warrior for peace” (“Dalai 
Lama’s” 2007). 
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The tension between Beijing and the Western governments over this issue 
increased in March 2008. On March 14, rioters in Tibet set hundreds of fires and 
assaulted ethnic Han Chinese as well as Chinese Muslims. As the crackdown in 
Tibet began to unfold, the Dalai Lama expressed fears that “a lot of casualties may 
happen” as a result of the protests and appealed to the international community for 
help. Just one day after his appeal, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met the 
Dalai Lama in India on March 21, the first high-profile Western official to meet 
the Dalai Lama since protests in Tibet turned violent. At the meeting Pelosi called 
for an international investigation into the situation in Tibet and criticized China’s 
handling of the unrest in Tibet (“U.S. House Speaker” 2008). While addressing a 
crowd of thousands of Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, Pelosi called the crisis “a 
challenge to the conscience of the world” and called on “freedom-loving people” 
to denounce China (“Top US Politician” 2008). French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
suggested he could boycott the opening ceremony of Olympic Games in August 
2008 when he arrived in the United Kingdom for a two-day state visit, who urged 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to do the same. Sarkozy told reporters in 
southwest France “Our Chinese friends must understand the worldwide concern 
that there is about the question of Tibet, and I will adapt my response to the 
evolutions in the situation that will come” (“China Lashes Out” 2008) On April 8, 
as the arrival of the Olympic torch was met by Tibetans and Tibet activists in San 
Francisco, the U.S. House of Representatives was debating House Resolution 1077, 
introduced by Speaker Nancy Pelosi and nine members who made up a delegation 
that met with Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. This Resolution, criticizing China over 
“repression” in Tibet, called on China to end its crackdown in Tibet and for the 
Beijing government to enter into a results-based dialogue with the Dalai Lama. 
The next day, H.R. 1077 passed overwhelmingly by a vote of 413 to 1 (Tenzin 
2008). 
The Western government’s stands on the Tibet riots infuriate the Chinese. In 
Bajoria’s article, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, professor at the University of Michigan, 
says that the Chinese see these anti-Olympic protests as an indication that 
regardless of how much China strives to become a constructive player in the world, 
and that “many in the West will never accept that, [and] will seek to humiliate 
them.” (Bajoria, 2008) As a result, West-bashing was widespread among the 
Chinese throughout the world.  
In major cities in China, angary protesters organized demonastrators in front of 
Carrefour shopping centers to encourage people to impose an embargo on French 
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products after protests in Paris.  They used internet and mobile phones to condemn 
Carrefour Company of support Dalai Lama, but Carrefour CEO Jose-Luis Duran 
rejected such rumor. (“Anti-Carrefour Protests Spread” 2008; “Carrefour Faces 
China Boycott Bid”, 2008; and “Carrefour CEO Denies Backing Dalai Lama” 
2008). “If Bush meets the Dalai Lama right now, or if the Congress does anything, 
the Chinese people might do something,” said Tong Zeng. Mr. Tong also spoke 
that Internet was fulfilled with enraged remarks about the latest conference 
between Nancy Pelosi and the Dalai Lama (“Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet 
Crackdown” 2008). 
Zhang Quanyi, associate professor at the Zhejiang Wanli University in Ningbo, 
China, commented, “Western leaders have been aggressive in adding oil to the fire. 
French President Nikolas Sarkozy warned he might boycott the opening ceremony 
of the Beijing Olympic Games, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel also said 
she would not attend. The U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi even said the 
International Olympic Committee had made a mistake in awarding the 2008 
Summer Olympics to China. China expressed strong indignation over this, saying 
it would encourage pro-independence forces” (Zhang 2008). Song Qiang, who 
contributed to both anti-Western books, China Can Say No and Unhappy China, 
wrote in the latest work that China should reduce the importance of Sino-French 
relations because of French President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, the 
exiled Tibetan spiritual leader who Beijing claimed, was sponsoring independence 
in the restless Tibet area (Ramzy 2009). 
Minxin Pei, a senior associate in the China program at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, also stated that “Chinese nationalism was 
actually partly a creation of Western imperialism” and that the Chinese feel very 
strongly about issues such as sovereignty and integrity of their territory because 
“they still have the historical memory of Western imperialism,” according to 
Bajoria’s article  (Bajoria, 2008). Dr. Wenran Jiang, professor of political science 
at the University of Alberta in Canada, stated that overseas Chinese might appear 
to be rallying behind Beijing in response to the Olympic torch relay protests and 
the unrest in Tibet, and that “They see the Tibetan issue as there’s a perceived 
danger of separating Tibet out of China and this becomes not a issue with the 
Chinese government anymore, it’s just about sovereignty, about historical ties. I 
think that’s why, this time, emotion is very high.” (Kuhn, 2008) 
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Western politicians claim that their fire is directed at the Beijing government, 
but they do not understand the minds of the Chinese. Some Chinese believe that 
China needs changes and reforms, but they also accept as true that China cannot 
change overnight. Xiao Gongqin, history professor at Shanghai Normal University, 
said, “Outsiders should avoid pressuring China too much or it will return to 
radicalism […] China will improve and enjoy more democratic rights, but it needs 
time.” (Magnier 2008) Although the Beijing government is not popular with all 
Chinese and many Chinese are opposed to its corruption and incompetence, they 
do not have any alternative. They still have only one government––Beijing 
represents their interests. Indeed, today the Chinese public has been 
overwhelmingly content with the direction in which their country is headed. In a 
spring 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 87% 
of Chinese say they are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, 
and 91% of Chinese characterize their country’s economic situation as good. (Bell 
2011) To many Chinese, the West’s unfriendly attitude and policies toward 
Beijing are directed toward the Chinese people. The Western pressure on Beijing 
backfires by offending Chinese patriotic sensibilities. 
 
3.4 Western Media’s Prejudice and Bias 
Western mainstream media helps contribute to anti-Western sentiments among the 
Chinese. Many Chinese people claim that Western media has showed not only 
anti-Beijing tendency but also a bias and prejudice against the Chinese people, 
which has spread wider since 2000. Many Chinese hold that Western media 
coverage of China is built on the Cold War theory, Western ideology, and national 
interest, and even white chauvinism, and that such biased information has 
segregated the Western public from the reality of China. Many Chinese consider 
that the West has become even more hostile toward China, and that the most 
evident example of this hostility is the way the Western media covers China. For 
example, Dr. Chen Yongsheng complains that Western media reports of China 
have displayed ignorance and prejudice, and that the reporting of China more 
generally is only stories about censorship, spoiled food products, human rights 
issues, dangerous toys, poisonous milk, and others. Dr. Chen claims that such bias 
reports only put fuel on the Chinese‘s rejection to the West while stirring up their 
patriotic passion (Interview with Professor Chen Yongsheng, 2009). 
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Western media’s attitude toward the 2008 Olympic is one case in point. Sports 
become a national passion. When China won the right to hold 2008 Olympics, the 
Chinese throughout the world exploded in delight, believing that this is the first 
time China holds the Games, and that China has finally been recognized as a rising 
state after a century of isolation and humiliation. Many Chinese hoped to use 2008 
Olympic moment to demonstrate how China had become a modern and peaceful 
world power at the turn of the 21
st
 century. Many Chinese also thought that pride 
in Chinese athletes would unify the Chinese all over the world.  Prior to the 
Beijing Olympic, however, some Western newspapers compared China's hosting 
of the Olympics to that of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime. Ex-British Cabinet Minister 
Michael Portillo, who was Britain’s defense secretary from 1995–97, likened the 
2008 Beijing Olympics to the 1936 Berlin Games. In an editorial titled “Tibet: the 
West Can Use the Olympics as a Weapon against Beijing”, published in the 
Sunday Times on March 22, 2008, Portillo cites the use of the Berlin Olympics as 
a “showcase for Nazism” to rebuke world leaders for disregarding China’s poor 
human rights record. Portillo states, “The leadership must by now be wondering 
whether staging the Games in Beijing will bring the regime more accolades than 
brickbats”. (“China Lashes Out At British Press”)  
CNN’s anti-Chinese comments are another case. On the April 9, 2008, the 
CNN Situation Room asked for remarks on the U.S. China relationship, Jack 
Cafferty answered, “I think they’re basically the same bunch of goons and thugs 
they’ve been for the last 50 years.” (“The Situation Room” April 9, 2008) Angered 
by such a statement, the Legal Immigrant Association started an online petition 
calling for a formal apology because Cafferty’s anti-Chinese comments had 
aggravated destructive attitudes held by some Americans toward the Chinese and 
Chinese Americans. On the April 14 broadcast of CNN’s Situation Room, Cafferty 
defended his observation: “Last week, during a discussion of the controversy 
surrounding China’s hosting of the Olympic Games, I said that the Chinese are 
basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they have been for the last 50 years. I 
was referring to the Chinese government, and not to Chinese people or to Chinese 
Americans.” (“The Situation Room” April 14, 2008) CNN issued a controversial 
apology on the same day, to “anyone who has interpreted the comments to be 
causing offense”, but many overseas Chinese, not satisfied with CNN’s response, 
launched protests against CNN. On April 26, in front of CNN headquarters in 
Atlanta, Georgia, several thousand Chinese American demonstrators picketed 
CNN’s office. Demonstrators also protested in front of a CNN office in San 
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Francisco and its Hollywood office (Mostrous 2008), demanding that CNN fire 
Cafferty from the network (“Protesters Gather” 2008). 
Western coverage of the March 2008 riots in Tibet is controversial. Some 
Chinese claimed that several Western media sources misreported and distorted the 
incident to tarnish China’s image. When running a cropped photo online, CNN 
removed a group of Tibetan protesters stoning a military vehicle. When many 
Chinese accused CNN of disseminating Western media bias, CNN insisted in a 
statement that its coverage was accurate but admitted to the cropping due to an 
editorial choice. (Kwok 2008)
 
Several Western news organizations also mislabeled 
photographs of police officers beating pro-Tibet protesters in Nepal as being from 
China in their reports of the riots. 
Western reports of the July 2009 riots in northwest China is also contentious. 
The July 2009 Ürümqi riots were a series of violent riots over several days that 
broke out on July 5, 2009 in Ürümqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region in north-western China. On the first day’s rioting, about 
1,000 Uyghurs began as a protest but escalated into violent assaults mainly on the 
Han Chinese people. People’s Armed Police were deployed to put down the riots. 
From the start, the Financial Times of London reported, “China’s bloodiest 
crackdown on protesters for 20 years reveals a government that is still more 
comfortable suppressing the symptoms of the country’s ethnic tensions than 
finding policies to solve the problems they cause.” (Editorial 2006) Many early 
reports of the riots incorrectly used a photo of a large number of People’s Armed 
Police squares to indicate the riots. Indeed, this picture was taken during the June 
2009 Shishou riot in Hubei Province of China and was initially issued on June 26 
by Southern Metropolis Weekly, a local government newspaper in Guangzhou.
 
The 
image was also put on the website of The Daily Telegraph, a daily morning 
broadsheet newspaper circulated throughout the United Kingdom and 
internationally, but was eradicated the next day (“Posted Photos” 2009). 
Many Chinese accused Western media of intentionally tarnishing China’s 
image by publishing false reports about the events in Tibet and Ürümqi, including 
mistakenly identifying scenes of police battling with protesters in Nepal as if it is 
taking place in Lhasa, and regarding People’s Armed Police square in Shishou as 
those in Ürümqi. The Chinese from around the world were infuriated by Western 
media’s prejudice and bias, and the wave of demonstrations as protests gained its 
strength in 2008. On March 29, in protest against German media’s biased and 
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distorted reports on the Tibet riots, about 120 Chinese people working and 
studying in Munich held a peaceful demonstration with placards bearing such 
slogans as “Listen to Different Voices” and “Freedom of the Press (Not Equal To) 
Incitement” in German and English. “The main purpose of these protests”, an 
organizer wrote, was “to urge the German media to stop their biased reports and 
also to attract the German public to our website to gain different perspectives and 
start the dialogue.” (“Protest in Silence”) On April 19, 1,300 people assembled 
outside BBC buildings in Manchester and London, protesting against what they 
described as Western media bias (“Anti-French” 2008). At the same time 
numerous Chinese Australians organized a large demonstration in Sydney, 
pronouncing support for Beijing and opposing what they saw as Western media 
bias. The demonstrators were carrying signs which read “Shame on Some Western 
Media”, “BBC CNN Lies too” and “Stop Media Distortion!”. During an interview, 
a demonstrator told the reporter of BBC, “I saw some news from CNN, from the 
BBC, some media (inaudible), and they are just lying.” (“Pro-China” 2008) Wang 
Xiaoping, a Chinese doctor in the city of Guangzhou in southern China 
complained in 2009, “The Western media’s coverage of China has always been 
prejudiced against the Chinese, seeing China through tainted glasses. The Western 
media’s arrogance toward China has blinded their vision, and the Western media is 
losing its credibility.” (Interview with Wang Xiaoping 2009)  In 2008, a report was 
prepared by the Committee of 100 with the assistance of Zogby International and 
the Horizon Research Consultancy Group. Entitled “Hope and Fear”, the report 
outlined the results of opinion polls regarding Chinese and American attitudes 
towards each other. The report found that a significant proportion of the Chinese 
general public believe that the Western media portrays China inaccurately (“Hope 
and Fear” 2007). 
Western media complain the less freedom of the press and media and internet 
censorship in China, which prevents them from securing first-hand information on 
Tibet. Some Chinese people may know little about Tibet’s different interpretation 
of its history, partly because China’s propaganda may reflect only the official 
version of events, castigating the Dalai Lama as a terrorist “jackal” and calling for 
a “people’s war” to fight separatism in Tibet. For many Chinese, Tibetans have 
been granted special subsidies and benefits from the Beijing government in the 
past fifty years because of their ethnic status, and the protests occurred as 
ingratitude after Beijing spending a lot of money building roads, a high-altitude 
railroad and other infrastructure for the Tibet people.  
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While Western media support Tibetans so as to help them win their freedom 
out of the control of the Chinese government, many Chinese people regard Tibet 
protesters as terrorists attacking the Han Chinese. Dr Seema Anand, a reader of 
international relations at Westminster University in London, said that many 
Chinese regarded the Tibetan protests “as an attack on their core identity”, and that 
“it’s not only an attack on the state, but an attack on what it means to be Chinese.” 
(“Chinese Nationalism” 2008) Many Chinese not only support the Beijing 
government but also encourage the Chinese leaders to take strong, quick actions to 
suppress the rioters in Tibet. Meng Huizhong, an office worker, expressed anger at 
what she saw as a tolerant government response to Tibet turbulence. Like many 
Chinese, Meng was horrified firstly by the violent Tibetan protests in Lhasa and 
then was appalled that the government had failed to initially extinguish the 
brutality. She said that  “We couldn’t believe our government was being so weak 
and cowardly. […] The Dalai Lama is trying to separate China, and it is not 
acceptable at all. We must crack down on the rioters.” (“Chinese Nationalism” 
2008) Ms. Emily Parker, an assistant editorial features editor of The Wall Street 
Journal, commented on the Tibet riots in 2008, “In some cases, nationalists have 
accused Beijing of not defending Chinese interests strongly enough.” (Parker 2008) 
It is obvious that the Chinese anti-Western sentiments not only result from 
official propaganda but also from the Chinese reactions provoked by the West. Da 
Wei, associate research professor of China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations, was a visiting associate at the School of Advanced 
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in 2008. Wei points out, “This 
situation (Anti-Western nationalism) has greater implications than previous waves 
of nationalism. […]. Rather, it is about the pride of China and the prejudice of the 
West.” (Da 2008) Ms. Emily Parker also writes, “Chinese nationalism is not just 
coming from the top down. […] These nationalist outbursts may have been 
influenced by years of propaganda, but they are not always dictated from the top.” 
(Parker 2008)  
 
4 Conclusion 
There is a deep suspicion between the Chinese and Westerners. Chinese anti-
Westernism expressing a strong resentment of Western political and economic 
dominance is nurtured by past humiliation and new self-confidence which is 
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matching with China’s rapid economic power. As a rising state, the Chinese want 
to be treated equally and fairly by the Western countries and to have more voice in 
the international affairs while the West still sees China as the same “Communist 
China” as they did during the Cold War period and attempts not to recognize its 
recent successful accomplishments.  
Chinese anti-Western sentiments are perhaps unavoidable because both China 
and the West have different ideologies, cultures, political and economic systems, 
and levels of development, as well as diverging interests. The West, worrying 
about the rising China that may not play by international rules, encourages Beijing 
to carry out political and social reforms. The Chinese leaders, having no intention 
to do along the Western lines, have responded with nationalistic grievance. The 
combination of Western countries’ pressure on China and China’s antagonism 
toward the West will continue to lead to Chinese anti-Western nationalism for a 
long time. However, the desire for Sino-Western cooperation still exists because 
both have common interest. If the West understands China’s culture and history 
better and has the courage to shun its hegemonic imperatives, and if China reduces 
its anti-Western propaganda, Chinese anti-Western nationalism may gradually 
decrease. 
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